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1 
Abstract 
The expectation that the common currency would foster economic conver-
gence and even force Europe into deeper political integration was once wide-
spread. It never materialised. Under the impact of the financial crisis socio-
economic divergence even among the members of the Eurozone deepened 
dramatically. European crisis politics therefore though to impose convergence 
through budgetary prescriptions and austerity measures. The essay does not 
only raise normative objections; based on the economic sociology of Karl Po-
lanyi and insights of the varieties of capitalism studies it submits that these ef-
forts are bound to generate serous resistance. The follow-up query is whether 
Europe would be better advised to replace its one-size-fits-all mantra by poli-
cies tolerating diversity and fostering cooperative problem-solving. To what 
degree such a return to the “united in diversity” motto of the Constitutional 
Treaty of 2014 would be economically beneficial is unpredictable. It seems 
highly likely, however, that it could help to overcome the increasing aversion 
against the European integration project.  
Keywords 
Crisis politics; socio-economic divergence, Böckenförde’s theorem; social 
embeddedness; varieties of capitalism; united in diversity 
 
 

1 
Introduction 
The relationship between the title and the subtitle of this essay requires some 
explanatory remarks. The main title may imply an unfortunate dichotomy. So-
cio-economic, cultural and political diversity are widely perceived as an obsta-
cle to integration, and hence as something which should be overcome on the 
road to an “ever closer union”. This, however, is by no means the message of 
these pages. Quite to the contrary, we suggest that the Union would be well 
advised to live with diversity, that diversity can be a politically sound and eco-
nomically beneficial alternative to the kind of convergence which the integra-
tion through law agenda of the formative period of the integration process and 
the crisis politics of the past decade have pursued so rigorously. But our thesis 
has a prominent precursor, albeit one, which remained an unspecified procla-
mation. “United in Diversity” was the fortunate motto of the ill-fated Draft 
Constitutional Treaty of 2004. The motto did not make it into the Treaty of 
Lisbon. This does not mean that it is outdated. The times Europe is going 
through are so hard that we cannot shy away from rethinking the project, from 
re-considering its foundations, from citing Germany’s greatest poet in a trans-
lation through which the beauty of his language gets lost, “what holds Europe 
together at its innermost”. What could that be? Is our highest commitment to 
ensure “the financial stability of the euro area as a whole … and of the Union 
itself”?1 Jan-Werner Müller2 has recently recalled Ernst-Wolfgang 
Böckenförde’s famous transferral of Goethe’s query into the parlance of con-
stitutionalism: secularised democracies, he submitted, live on normative re-
sources, which they cannot generate themselves.3 What if we bring this dictum 
to the peoples of Europe? A tentative and somewhat enigmatic will be submit-
ted in the concluding remarks. The argumentation leading to that conclusion 
are more mundane. We will take four steps: 
1. The first is an explication a substantive understanding of “the econom-
ic”, which is informed by the economic sociology of Karl Polanyi; 
2. against this background section two will proceed to a critique “one-size-
fits-all” integration strategies; 
3. section 3 will criticise the efforts of Europe’s crisis politics to impose 
                                                 
1  Judgment of 27 November 2012 in Pringle v. Ireland, C-370/12, EU:C:2012:756, 
para. 5. 
2  NZZ, 26.8.2017, available at: https://www.nzz.ch/feuilleton/das-boeckenfoerde-
diktum-was-haelt-demokratien-zusammen-ld.1312681. 
3  Ernst-Wolfang Böckenförde, “Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der Säkulari-
sation”, in id. Staat, Gesellschaft, Freiheit. Studien zur Staatstheorie und zum Ver-
fassungsrecht, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 1975, 42-64. 
2 
convergence on the economies of the Union; 
4. “United in Diversity”, the just mentioned motto of the Constitutional 
Treaty of 2004 is read as an alternative vision, which section 4 will sub-
stantiate; 
“What could hold Europe together at its innermost?” The epilogue will return 
to this query (V.).  
I.  “The Economic” in Economic Sociology 
“European economic law” is a discipline of huge proportions which explores 
meticulously every angle of the legal provisions which concern the European 
economy, the integration process, and governance arrangements which this 
process has generated. Why should there be a reason to re-consider these activ-
ities in the light of Polanyi’s economic sociology? The surplus of such an ex-
ercise stems from conceptual deficiencies of the prevailing views in both law 
and economics and their understanding of markets or, rather, “the economic”. 
The deficiency which has, in this author’s view, to be cured is the insulation of 
economic processes from their embeddedness in society. This insulation is, to 
paraphrase another Polanyian notion, “fictitious”. To be sure, it is by now 
common knowledge that the operation of markets, pre-supposes the establish-
ment of institutional frameworks; we are equally well aware of many micro-
economic and macro-economic policies supporting or correcting the function-
ing of the economy. And yet, in the prevailing conceptualisations, the econo-
my is portrayed as machinery, which is distinct from political and societal 
spheres, from Staat und Gesellschaft. In particular, markets are understood as 
autonomous, self-regulating entities. The contrast is striking: “A self-
regulating market”, so Polanyi has famously stated, “could not exist for any 
length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society; 
it would have physically destroyed man and transformed his surroundings into 
a wilderness”.4 I do not try to dig deeper but conclude with the summarising 
submission that the economy “is” a polity,5 that its sustainability depends, to 
paraphrase Böckenförde, on social and moral resources which it cannot gener-
ate autonomously. 
                                                 
4  Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of 
Our Time, Boston MA: Beacon Press 2001 (with Foreword by Joseph Stiglitz and 
Introduction by Fred Block), 3. 
5  Christian Joerges, Bo Stråth and Peter Wagner, The Economy as Polity: The Politi-
cal Constitution of Contemporary Capitalism, London: UCL Press 2005. 
3 
II.  Implications and Options 
How should such an understanding of the economy as polity affect our views 
of European economic integration? I refrain from a systematic elaboration and 
take instead a shortcut. Karl Polanyi’s Great Transformation is concerned with 
the emergence of “market societies”, where “instead of the economy embed-
ded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economy”.6 Writ-
ing at the end of the Great War, Polanyi had witnessed the destruction of liber-
al economic ordering by Fascism and Nazism. However, by now, at the end of 
the Second World War, the rebirth of alternative counter-movements was in 
sight and nurtured hopes in a better national and international future: alterna-
tives to the Fascist transformation, namely, social counter-movements which 
would undermine the working of the market system. His somewhat enigmatic 
views are difficult to decipher. “The Great Transformation can legitimately be 
read either as an anti-capitalist manifesto or as a social democratic bedtime 
story”.7 Be that as it may, my shortcut is a passage in which Polanyi considers 
that: 
“… with the disappearance of the automatic mechanism of the gold standard, 
governments will find it possible to […] tolerate willingly that other nations 
shape their domestic institutions according to their inclinations, thus transcend-
ing the pernicious nineteenth century dogma of the necessary uniformity of do-
mestic regimes within the orbit of world economy. Out of the ruins of the Old 
World, cornerstones of the New can be seen to emerge: economic collaboration 
of governments and the liberty to organize national life at will.”8 
Was this just wishful thinking? The passage was written at a time when 
Keynes and the like-minded American economist and politician Harry Dexter 
White were working towards the post-war settlement of Bretton Woods. There 
were reasons to envisage a better future. Polanyi’s considerations deserve at-
tention for three additional and interrelated reasons. For one, he re-states his 
foundational argument that the capitalist market economy is not an evolution-
ary given but a political product – “laissez-faire was planned”9 – which re-
quires institutional backing and continuous political management. To put it 
slightly differently, “the political” is inherent in “the economic”; market econ-
omies “are polities”.10 A second insight of topical importance follows from 
                                                 
6  Polanyi (note 4), 57. 
7  Gareth Dale, Karl Polanyi. A Life on the Left, New York: Columbia UP, 2016, 286. 
8  Polanyi (note 4 above), 253-254. 
9  “…planning was not”, Polanyi, at 147. 
10  For a very dense re-construction, see Fred Block, “Towards a New Understanding of 
Economic Modernity”, in: Christian Joerges et al. (eds), n. 5 above, 3-16. 
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this: capitalist market economies will exhibit varieties which mirror a variety 
of political preferences, historical experiences, and socio-economic configura-
tions. This is what we can expect, and should respect, once our societies have 
gained the “liberty to organise national life at will”. The third point is only al-
luded to in half a sentence. It is an implication of the new freedom. Polanyi 
predicts and advocates “collaboration”; diversity, we can assume, is there to 
stay. 
Let me postpone the discussion of this somewhat vague prospect and hope, 
and underline first its more substantiated basis and background. Since the “va-
rieties of capitalism” studies were initiated by Peter A. Hall and David Soskice 
in 2011,11 it has become common knowledge that the operation of market 
economies is anything but uniform. Their institutional configurations vary, in-
stead, significantly. The co-ordinated market economies of northern Europe 
and the Anglo-Saxon liberal market economies have become paradigmatic ex-
amples; mixed market economies haven been more recently identified in 
Southern Europe.12 The discovery of Lucio Baccaro and others of “Growth 
Models and Distributive Dynamics” has diversified the landscape further.13 A 
cobbler like myself should stick to his last. What I find most noteworthy and 
what the varieties studies neglect is Polanyi’s characterisation of economic or-
dering as a political and societal process.14 This is a dimension which another 
forerunner of the varieties studies, namely, Walter Eucken, left aside when he 
conceded that the “characteristics of national competitive orders … manifest 
differently, for example, in Germany, Belgium, or the United States”.15 This 
political-process dimension, however, is a legal essential. We need to under-
                                                 
11  Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (2001), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional 
Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001. 
12  Anke Hassel, “Adjustments in the Eurozone: Varieties of Capitalism and the Crisis 
in Southern Europe” (17 April 2014); available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2426198. In much more detail and with many provisos, see Gareth Dale, “Double 
movements and pendular forces: Polanyian perspectives on the neoliberal age”, 
(2012) 60 Current Sociology, 3-27; id., “Social Democracy, Embeddedness and De-
commodification: On the Conceptual Innovations and Intellectual Affiliations of 
Karl Polanyi”, (2010) 15 New Political Economy, 369-393. 
13  See Lucio Baccaro and Chiara Benassi (2017): “Throwing out the Ballast: Growth 
Models and the Liberalization of German Industrial Relations”, (2017) 15 Socio-
Economic Review, 85-115. 
14  Much later elaborated in Karl Polanyi, “The Economy as Instituted Process” [1957], 
in: Mark Granovetter and Richard Swedberg (eds), The Sociology of Economic Life, 
2nd ed. (Boulder CO-San Francisco CA-Oxford: Westview Press, 2001), 31-50. 
15  Walter Eucken, “What is a competitive order?“ [1952], in Thoms Biebricher and 
Frieder S. Vogelmann (eds), The Birth of Austerity: German Ordoliberalism and 
Contemporary Neoliberalism, London: Rowman and Littlefield, 99-108, 100. 
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stand the normative fabric of our economic orders as an acquis sociale, which 
is, of course, subject to changes, but nonetheless deserves to be protected 
against illegitimate intrusions. A strong indicator of the importance of this 
point is the fierce controversy that it has provoked between Wolfgang Streeck 
and Jürgen Habermas. Streeck opts for a defence of the nation state and its in-
stitutions against a deepening of economic integration.16 Habermas’ critique is 
that this is a nostalgic option, a hideaway in the sovereign powerlessness of the 
overrun nation (eine “nostalgische Option für eine Einigelung in der sou-
veränen Ohnmacht der überrollten Nation”).17 I cite a recent re-statement of 
Streeck: 
“[W]hat I would suggest to call the acquises démocratiques of the national 
demoi in Europe … importantly comprises a wide range of political-economic 
institutions that provide for democratic corrections of market outcomes – for 
democracy as social democracy.”18 
I must admit that I find Streeck more Habermasian than Habermas himself. I 
read his defence of the national constellation as the plea to take deliberative 
democracy seriously. This plea is, of course, linked to sociological premises 
and political assessments. Streeck simply does not believe that a European so-
cial democracy is a conceivable option. But are we really entrapped in the di-
chotomy? 
Back to Polanyi, however. The passage that I have cited is not about output 
legitimacy, let alone economic efficiency. Polanyi’s appeal to the liberty of 
societies is, instead, concerned with ideational and cultural dimensions of “the 
economic”. His argument takes seriously, or is at least open to, what the varie-
ties of capitalism studies tend to neglect. Precisely for this reason his position 
seems so topical. Ideational, cultural, historical aspects are an indispensable 
element of an adequate understanding of “the economic”. A whole new sub-
discipline (“cultural political economy”) focusing on this dimension is emerg-
ing.19 This seems particularly important in view of the deep diversities within 
                                                 
16  Wolfgang Streeck, “Small-State Nostalgia? The Currency Union, Germany, and Eu-
rope: A Reply to Jürgen Habermas”, (2014) 21 Constellations, 213-221. 
17  Jürgen Habermas, “Demokratie oder Kapitalismus. Vom Elend der nationalstaatli-
chen Fragmentierung in einer kapitalistisch integrierten Weltgesellschaft”, Blätter 
für deutsche und internationale Politik 5/2013, 59-70 (“Nostalgische Kleinstaaterei”, 
62). 
18  Wolfgang Streeck, How Will Capitalism End?, London: Verso Books, 2016, 198, n. 
20. 
19  See Bob Jessop and Ngai-Ling Sum, Towards a Cultural Political Economy. Putting 
Culture in its Place in Political Economy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2013; “Cultural Political Economy: Logics of Discovery, Epistemic Fallacies, the 
Complexity of Emergence, and the Potential of the Cultural Turn”, (2010) 15 , 445-
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the European space. The works of economic historians such as Werner Abel-
shauser and the path-breaking comparative law studies of Gunther Teubner 
share this view and add that “cultures” tend to be remarkably resistant to im-
posed change.20 Both underline that interventions into the respective social and 
institutional fabric of European economies can hardly be subtle and sufficient-
ly fine-tuned to accomplish the desired re-orientation.21 
III.  The State of the Union after a Decade of Crisis Politics 
The normative value of diversity does not inform us how this value might be 
established and preserved. Before entering into such unchartered waters and 
evaluating the risks of such an endeavour, we have to consider the state of the 
Union after a decade of crisis politics. The event from which we depart is the 
establishment of the EMU in the Maastricht Treaty. This is by no means to 
camouflage earlier unfortunate decisions and developments.22 But it neverthe-
less seems obvious that the specific patterns of the crisis have been shaped by 
this Treaty. 
III.1  An ill-designed Treaty 
This Treaty has produced a hybrid, an odd merger of ordo-liberal principles 
and French endeavours to ensure some political governance of the economy. 
Germany was successful with the defence of its stability philosophy through 
substantive principles and statutory norms; France established a counterweight 
in the procedural norms of the General ECB Council.23 Our focus here will be 
                                                                                                                                                     
451. 
20  Werner Abelshauser, Kulturkampf. Der deutsche Weg in die neue Wirtschaft und die 
amerikanische Herausforderung, Berlin: Kadmos; Werner Abelshauser, David Gil-
gen, and Andreas Leutzsch “Kultur, Wirtschaft, Kulturen der Weltwirtschaft“, in: 
Abelshauser, Werner, David Gilgen and Andreas Leutzsch (eds) Kulturen der Welt-
wirtschaft, Göttingen: Vandenhoek and Ruprecht, 9-29; Gunther Teubner, “Legal Ir-
ritants: Good Faith in British Law Or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Diffe-
rences”, (1998) 61 Modern Law Review, 11-32. 
21  Anke Hassel, “Adjustments in the Eurozone: Varieties of Capitalism and the Crisis 
in Southern Europe” (13 May 2014). LEQS Paper No. 76. Available at: SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2436454. 
22  See Giandomnico Mahone, Rethinking the Union of Europe post-Crisis – Has Inte-
gration Gone Too Far?, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 2014, passim. 
23  In a similar vein, see Sergio Fabbrini, “The Euro Crisis and its Constitutional Impli-
cations”, in: Sergio Champeau, Carlos Closa, Daniel Innerarity and Miguel Poiares 
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the tension between the conferral of exclusive powers in the – albeit undefined 
– field of monetary policy administered by a bank with unprecedented auton-
omy and the reservation of economic and fiscal policies by the Member States. 
This dichotomy was not wilful or accidental, but simply mirrored the concern 
of the Member States for “the power of the purse”. The ensuing dilemmas 
were predictable. Already in 1992, the socio-economic diversity within the 
Union and within the eurozone was considerable, and it deepened continuous-
ly. The implications can be derived from the insights into the socio-economic, 
political and cultural variety sketched out in the previous section. European 
monetary policy is uniform, but it is confronted with an ever deeper variety of 
national configurations. “One size fits none” – Henrik Enderlein’s barzelletta 
captures this well.24 The difficulties of macro-economic steering are exacerbat-
ed by the deeply engraved cultural diversities which render the Eurozone-wide 
communality of policy implementation illusory. 
Hence, in a sense, the Maastricht regime embodied a kernel of wisdom. Ar-
ticle 119 TFEU provided for no more than “the adoption of an economic poli-
cy which is based on the close coordination of Member States’ economic poli-
cies” as substantiated in Article 121 TFEU. This instrument was a lex imper-
fecta. The same holds true for the Stability and Growth Pact of 1997. By the 
same token, however, this wisdom was not strong enough to prevent what was 
going to happen. 
The tensions under the thin “constitutional” veneer of the Maastricht Treaty 
remained latent for a couple of years. As we know, post-2007, the success of 
the early years of the EMU was only due to good economic luck and constant 
political bargaining. The real life of the constitutional compromise was a prax-
is of muddling. Under the conditions of the common currency, the socio-
economic diversity within the eurozone was deepening irresistibly. After the 
financial and the sovereign debt crises, this diversity was to become an explo-
sive constellation. We have experienced highly differential growth and infla-
tion rates, cyclical divergences. We have learned about the reasons and mech-
anisms of these disastrous developments. Under the EMU, responses to these 
problems were not available. The fundamental design failure and constitutial 
deficit of this regime is the lack of a political infrastructure and institutional 
framework in which democratic political contestation could continue and legit-
imate a completion or improvement of the imperfect edifice that had been es-
tablished.25 
                                                                                                                                                     
Maduro (eds), The Future of Europe. Democracy, Legitimacy and Justice After the 
Euro Crisis, London-New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015, 19-36. 
24  Henrik Enderlein, “One Size Fits None”, (2005) 16 Central Banking, 24-28, 2005. 
25  The story of the European responses has been told often enough. Out of my own 
8 
III.2  Two Dead-end Alleys 
My whole thesis depends on the explanation of this dilemmatic constellation. 
What went wrong? My message is anything but comforting: Europe had no 
chance! Let us consider the two options which the designers of the Treaty had 
in mind. One can be understood as a version of economic constitutionalism. It 
is characterised by the lack of a legitimated political authority. No such trans-
national political authority was needed if, and, if so, because financial markets 
can be expected to supervise the performance of the Member States. The fa-
mous no bail-out clause of Article 125 of the Lisbon Treaty made it illegal for 
one member to assume the debts of another. We were thus protected against 
moral hazard. Or were we? The weakest link in this chain of arguments is the 
reliance on financial markets. To be sure von Hayek has tried to make us be-
lieve that markets are unique in their capacity to collect, process and co-
ordinate knowledge which is dispersed in society.26 But, as Lisa Herzog has 
objected with particular clarity,27 the knowledge which markets can communi-
cate is not the knowledge we need when we have to assess the performance of 
complex economic orders. Hayek’s wonderful conceptualisation of “competi-
tion as a discovery procedure”28 will not deliver what we need to know. Such 
asymmetries, we have been assuaged, will be compensated by highly profes-
sionalised ratings agencies which produce and offer such advice under compet-
itive conditions. This, again, is all too wishful thinking. The famous three big 
ratings agencies embody expert knowledge but not the ethics of the classical 
professions. Can we expect expertise to accomplish what markets fail to do? 
This is a complex story in general. In the case of the ratings agencies, however, 
I can simply refer to Mario Draghi’s famous defence of the OMT programme 
                                                                                                                                                     
contributions see, e.g., “Europe’s Economic Constitution in Crisis and the Emer-
gence of a New Constitutional Constellation”, (2014) 15 German Law Journal, 985-
1028. The descriptions, analyses and discussions fill libraries; an analysis with an 
exceptional sensitivity for the normative, legal and political aspects of the “rule of 
economics” is Klaus Tuori’s “The Eurosystem and the European Economic Consti-
tution: A Constitutional Analysis of Common Central Banking Before and During 
the Crisis”, PhD Thesis Helsinki, 1017, available at: https://helda.helsinki.fi/ 
handle/10138/200392. 
26  “The Use of Knowledge in Society”, (1945) 35 American Economic Review, 519-
530. 
27  Out of the works of Lisa Herzog, see Lisa Herzog, “Markets”, Stanford Encyclope-
dia of Philosophy 2013, 1-28; available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/markets/. 
28  Friedrich A. von Hayek, “Competition as Discovery Procedure” (Wettbewerb als 
Entdeckungsverfahren, 1968), (2002) 5 The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Econom-
ics, 9-23. 
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of the ECB on 26 July 2012.29 The markets got it wrong, he argued; this is why 
the ECB had to step in. 
Draghi’s “whatever it takes” announcement leads us to the second alterna-
tive: Are public authorities to step in where private organisations are not so 
reliable. Again, I hear von Hayek knocking at the door. He not only praised the 
performance of markets so impressively back in 1945; three decades later, he 
complemented his argument in his Nobel Prize Lecture on the “Pretence of 
Knowledge”.30 The lecture is thoroughly neglected in the debates on the per-
formance of the ECB or European crisis politics. This is difficult to justify. 
Hayek’s reserves against economic planning and steering deserve to be taken 
seriously. But this is again a matter which is too complex to be dealt with in 
passing. However, for my thesis, I can let this rest. The line of arguments that I 
have re-constructed upon the basis of Polanyi’s economic sociology, the varie-
ties of capitalism studies, and the insights into the importance of economic cul-
tures are sufficiently instructive. It is, against this background, simply incon-
ceivable that the ensemble of European economies will respond to the voices 
of public authorities in the same way; and it is even less likely that these au-
thorities will be in able to design and to implement sufficiently fine-tuned pro-
grammes targeted at the diversity of the constellation in the Eurozone. 
III.3  Authoritarian Managerialism 
It seems, against this background, but “logical” that European crisis politics 
operated as it did, namely, extra legem and in an authoritarian managerial 
mode.31 The first to underline this dilemma was the former constitutional judge 
Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, tellingly a confessed Schmittian.32 The treat-
ment of law, Böckenförde explained in a comment published by the Neue Zü-
                                                 
29  Verbatim at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html. 
30 “The Pretence of Knowledge”, Nobel memorial Lecture, 11 December 1974, (1989) 
79 The American Economic Review, 3-7, available at: http://pavroz.ru/files/haye 
kpretence.pdf. 
31  Christian Joerges and Maria Weimer, “A Crisis of Executive Managerialism in the 
EU: No Alternative?”, Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Paper No. 2012-7, avail-
able at: SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract; revised version in Gráínne de Búrca, Claire 
Kilpatrick and Joanne Scott (eds), Critical Legal Perspectives on Global Govern-
ance: Liber Amicorum for David M Trubek, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014, 295-
322. 
32  On Böckenförde’s indebtedness to Carl Schmitt, see the interview with Dieter 
Gosewinkel, in idem (ed.), Wissenschaft, Politik, Verfassungsgericht. Aufsätze von 
Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp 2010, 359-391. 
10 
richer Zeitung in June 2010,33 was “outrageous” (abenteuerlich). And, indeed, 
there is much to be irritated about. A particular intriguing characteristic of Eu-
rope’s new modes of economic governance is the form of its crisis manage-
ment. This managerialism is problematic for three inter-dependent reasons. 
First, through the supervision and control of macro-economic imbalances, it 
disregards the principle of enumerated powers, and, by the same token, cannot 
respect the democratic legitimacy of national institutions, in particular, the 
budgetary powers of the parliaments of the states receiving assistance. Second, 
in its departure from the one-size-fits-all philosophy orienting European inte-
gration in general and monetary policy in particular, it nonetheless fails to 
achieve a variation, which might be founded in democratically-legitimated 
choices; quite to the contrary, the individualised scrutiny of all Member States 
is geared to the objective of budgetary balances and seeks to impose the neces-
sary accompanying discipline. Under the conditions of monetary unity, the 
Member States can only respond to pertinent requests through austerity 
measures: an “internal devaluation” via reductions of wage levels and social 
entitlements.34 Third, the machinery of the new regime with its individualised 
measures which are oriented only by necessarily indeterminate general clauses 
is regulatory in its nature, establishing a transnational executive machinery 
outside the realm of democratic politics and the form of accountability which 
the rule of law used to guarantee. Core concepts used by new economic gov-
ernance cannot be defined with any precision, either by lawyers or by econo-
mists, and are therefore not justiciable.35 This implies that rule-of-law and le-
gal protection requirements are being suspended.36 This type of de-legalisation 
is accompanied by assessments of Member State performance, which cannot 
but operate in a highly discretionary manner. 
The most drastic illustrations were provided by the Six-pack and the Two-
pack Regulations, which seek to prevent and/or to correct excessive macroeco-
                                                 
33  Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, “Kennt die europäische Not kein Gebot? Die Webfeh-
ler der EU und die Notwendigkeit einer neuen politischen Entscheidung” (Does ne-
cessity not know rules? Design flaws of the EU and the necessity of a new political 
decision), Neue Züricher Zeitung, 21 June 2010.  
34  See, e.g., Mark Dawson and Floris de Witte, “Constitutional Balance in the EU after 
the Euro-Crisis”, (2013) 76 Modern Law Review, 817-844, at 825-7, notes 33-37. 
35  See Dariusz Adamski, “National Power Games and Structural Failures in the Euro-
pean Macroeconomic Governance”, (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review, 1319-
1364; Fritz W. Scharpf, “Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis and the Disabling of Demo-
cratic Accountability”, in: Wolfgang Streeck and Armin Schäfer (eds), Politics in the 
Age of Austerity, Cambridge: Polity, 108-142, at 139. 
36  See Michelle Everson, “The Fault of (European) Law in (Political and Social) Eco-
nomic Crisis”, (2013) 24 Law and Critique, 107-129. 
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nomic imbalances. As Fritz Scharpf has pointed out, the very logic of the ex-
cessive balance procedure “dictates that it must operate without any pre-
defined rule and that the Commission’s ad hoc decisions must apply to indi-
vidual Member States in unique circumstances rather than to the EMU states in 
general. Regardless of the comparative quality of its economic expertise, the 
Commission lacks legitimate authority to impose highly intrusive policy 
choices on Member States.37 Precisely, this is foreseen for an undefined range 
of policy areas in which the EU still lacks hard-law competences. 
IV.  “United in Diversity” 
Critics are expected to explain what they have to offer. Such requests tend to 
have silencing effects. The discussion on the management of the crisis is dom-
inated by economists and their expertise. A cobbler should stick to his last, 
goes a proverb in many languages. And, indeed, among both lawyers38 and po-
litical scientists,39 the prevailing view is that we should learn to live with the 
“new normalcy”. After all, the transformations which European crisis politics 
has brought about have been legalised by the European Court of Justice.40 
This is a premature end. We simply cannot know how stable the new nor-
malcy really is. What we know for sure, however, is that, the jurisprudence of 
the CJEU notwithstanding, the present state of the Union is threatening the le-
gitimacy of the integration project. What I will hence try to do in the remaining 
minutes is to sketch out an alternative, a series of intuitions about the socio-
economic basis, the normative essentials and the constitutional form of an al-
ternative approach. As announced in the first section, I will depart from Po-
lanyi’s economic sociology and his quest for co-operation among political au-
tonomous polities, proceed to the trilemma thesis of the Harvard political 
economist Dani Rodrik, move from there to the political philosophy of the EU 
recently submitted by Daniel Innerarity, and conclude with the thesis that con-
                                                 
37  See Fritz W. Scharpf, n. 35 above and id., “Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis and the 
Preemption of Democracy”, MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/11, Cologne 2011. 
38  See, prominently, Thomas Beukers, Claire Kilpatrick and Bruno De Witte, “Consti-
tutional Change Through Euro-Crisis Law: Taking Stock, New Perspectives and 
Looking Ahead”, in: id. (eds), Constitutional Change through Euro-Crisis Law, 
Cambridge: CUP 2017, 1-24. 
39  E.g., Tanja Börzel, “Researching the EU (Studies) into Demise”, (2018) 25 JEPP, 
475-485. 
40  Pringle (n. 1 above); judgment of 16 June 2015 in Peter Gauweiler and others v. 
Deutscher Bundestag, C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400. 
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flicts law is the proper constitutional form of the EU. 
This is quite a journey. 
1. But the first step is very short. To cite the passage from the beginning 
again: “Out of the ruins of the Old World, cornerstones of the New can 
be seen to emerge: economic collaboration of governments and the lib-
erty to organize national life at will.”41 Political autonomy should not get 
lost in integration but be preserved in co-operative arrangements. 
2. Dani Rodrik has never cited Polanyi in his works on globalisation. But 
these works are infiltrated with Polanyian ideas, and Rodrik has 
acknowledged his indebtedness to Polanyi explicitly.42 For our context, 
his most famous theorem seems particularly instructive. In his book, The 
Globalization Paradox,43 Rodrik asserts the impossibility of simultane-
ous pursuit of economic globalisation, democratic politics and national 
determination (autonomy), highlighting a trilemma in which only two 
goals can be paired: economic globalisation and democratic politics, or 
democracy and national autonomy. For Rodrik, the EU furnishes dra-
matic illustration of his thesis. On the one hand, the EU could transna-
tionalise democracy through federalisation and thereby defend the ad-
vantages of the common market; at the same time, however, it would be 
forced to establish a common European politics to legitimise its neces-
sary assumption of fiscal and social policy, with negative consequences 
for national sovereignty. In the absence of such a denationalising will, 
the EU must give up the common currency and accept economic disin-
tegration.44 What is lacking here is Polanyi’s “Third Way”: to wit, co-
operation. This is the alternative which I would like to defend.45 
                                                 
41  Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, n. 4 above, at 253-254 (emphasis in origi-
nal). 
42  See http://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2017/03/a-foreword-to-kari-
polan 
yi-levitt.html. 
43  Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World 
Economy, New York-London: W.W. Norton, 2011. 
44  Dani Rodrik, “The Future of European Democracy”, ms. Princeton NJ, 2014, availa-
ble at: https://www.sss.ias.edu/files/pdfs/Rodrik/Commentary/Future-of-Demo 
cracy-in-Europe.pdf. 
45  Rodrik’s recent Straight Talk on Trade. Ideas for a Sane World Economy, Princeton 
NJ-Oxford: Princeton UP, 2017, has a chapter with an update on Europe (pp. 48-78). 
Therein Rodrik repeats: “If European democracies are to regain their health, eco-
nomic integration and political integration cannot remain out of sync. Either political 
integration catches up with economic integration or economic integration needs to be 
scaled back (at 76). There are, however signals of a re-orientation. The in my view 
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3. Fortunately enough, there is an elaborated philosophical underpinning 
for this vision available, to be found in Daniel Innerarity’s concept of 
“inter-democracy”.46 Two insights are particularly important for my ar-
gument. The first concerns Europe’s heterogeneity which excludes all 
“one-size-fits-all” recipes. Instead: “If the EU is going to be more dem-
ocratic, it will be so in the style of complex democracies. And that com-
plexity is not only related to the diversity of its citizens but to the variety 
of issues about which it needs to decide, some of which may require 
proximity, but others that demand a certain distance.”47 “Inter-
democracy” is his key concept: the democratisation of interdependencies 
must replace state-like or federal hierarchical models, he argues force-
fully. And: “The states are increasingly more incapable of democratic 
action because they cannot include everyone affected by their decisions 
in the electoral process and, on the flip side, citizens cannot influence 
the behaviour of those who are making decisions in their name. This is 
the principal democratic deficit that the European Union should rectify. 
Extraterritorial effects and the burdens that one state imposes on others 
cannot be justified by recourse to domestic democratic procedures and 
require another type of legitimacy. That is why we can affirm that the 
fact that national actors keep outside interests in mind may improve the 
representation of true domestic interests, since they are no longer cir-
cumscribed by the state arena either. In this sense, we might think that 
the EU helps strengthen the democratic authority of the member states, 
to the extent to which it can serve as a measure to manage externalities 
in an efficient fashion.”48 
4. The so-called principle of external effects has such ardent critics as Al-
exander Somek,49 and such prominent defenders as Jürgen Habermas.50 
                                                                                                                                                     
most promising of these is in line with his more general ideas about globalization. 
Globalisation requirements must remain consistent with democratic delegation; they 
must “enhance democratic deliberation domestically” (at 65). On such affinities with 
the conflicts-law approach see more systematically Fabian Bohnenberger and Chris-
tian Joerges, ”A Conflicts-Law Response to the Precarious Legitimacy of Transna-
tional Trade Governance” (1 June 2017), forthcoming in Research Handbook on the 
Sociology of International Law, edited by Moshe Hirsch and Andrew Lang. Availa-
ble at: SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009914. 
46  Daniel Innerarity, Democracy in Europe. A Political Philosophy of the EU, London: 
Palgrave Macmillan (forthcoming March 2018). 
47  Introduction at 7. 
48  Chapter 3, at 10. 
49  “The Argument from Transnational Effects I: Representing Outsiders through Free-
dom of Movement”, (2010) 16 European Law Journal, 315-344; “The Argument 
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Jürgen Neyer and I first submitted it back in 1997 in an essay on Euro-
pean comitology.51 The basic premise and intuition is very simple: it is a 
core premise of theories of democracy, most notably of Habermas’ dis-
course theory of law and democracy, that we, the citizens, must be able 
to understand ourselves as the authors of the legal provisions with which 
we are expected to comply. Under conditions of Europeanisation and 
globalisation and ever more growing interdependences, this is no longer 
conceivable. To cite Habermas himself: “Nation-states … encumber 
each other with the external effects of decisions that impinge on third 
parties who had no say in the decision-making process. Hence, states 
cannot escape the need for regulation and coordination in the expanding 
horizon of a world society that is increasingly self-programming, even at 
the cultural level ....”52 It is difficult to reject these insights. The implica-
tions are, of course, controversial. Among the three just-named alterna-
tives – state-building, down-scaling of integration, co-operation – I opt 
for the third. In the European case, we can build on European law’s po-
tential to compensate for the legitimacy deficits of national rule. Euro-
pean law can derive its own legitimacy from this function: its mandate is 
to implement the commitments of the Member States towards each other 
by two legal claims, namely, the requirement to take the interests and 
concerns of their neighbours into account when designing national poli-
cies, and by imposing a duty to co-operate. The very notion of co-
operation indicates that this kind of rule cannot be some “command and 
control” exercise, but must rely on the deliberative quality of co-
operative interactions. Two important implications should be underlined. 
The first: there is no in-built-guarantee that such cooperative efforts will, 
in the end, be successful; but such limitations need not be damaging per 
se; quite to the contrary, they may document mutual respect of essential, 
yet distinct, values and commitments of the other (the ordre public in the 
parlance of conflict of laws and private international law). The second 
implication is more drastic: socio-economic, institutional, political and 
cultural diversity is particularly strong and difficult to overcome. This, 
                                                                                                                                                     
from Transnational Effects II: Establishing Transnational Democracy”, (2010) 16 
European Law Journal, 375-394. 
50  See Jürgen Habermas, “Does the Contitutionalization of International Law still have 
a Chance” (translated by Cirian Cronin), in Jürgen Habermas, The Divided West, 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 113-193. 
51  Christian Joerges and Jürgen Neyer, “From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Delib-
erative Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology”, (1997) 3 Eu-
ropean Law Journal, 273-299. 
52  Habermas, n. 50, at 176. 
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however, is by no means a plea for inactivity; it is, instead, a reminder 
that we have to distinguish “justice within” consolidated polities, on the 
one hand, and “justice between” them, on the other - and that we have to 
work in both spheres.53 Last, but not least, it should, in view of the ob-
jections raised above against the discretionary mode of crisis govern-
ance, be underlined that the conflicts approach defend the ideas of law-
mediated legitimacy of public rule. 
V.  Epilogue 
How much realism is in this “united in diversity” vision defended here? It is to 
be conceded that this perspective is a response to the social deficits of Eu-
rope’s crisis politics and the normative fragility of its present constitutional 
constellation. The praxis which this vision envisages certainly depends, to in-
voke Böckenförde’s famous dictum again,54 on cultural and normative re-
sources which cannot be produced wilfully or by some political or legislative 
fiat. European integration research used to be aware of such dependencies and 
has sought to identify them. As, for example, Joseph Weiler, in his insightful 
first reflection on supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, has underlined, 
the supremacy of European law was anything other than self-sustaining; in-
stead, acceptance for its operation was held in precarious equilibrium, and de-
pendent upon continuous political processes of intergovernmentalism and con-
tinuing commitment to the defence of the community spirit.55 “Fin-de Siècle 
Europe” with its appeal to peace, prosperity and supranationalism was a simi-
lar, only slightly more mundane, suggestion.56 “Political Messianism” is a 
more desperate, crisis-driven version.57 Lawyers with their normative sensibili-
ties are by no means the only ones who try to spell out what might hold socie-
ties in general and Europe in particular together. To take the two “Polanyians” 
                                                 
53  Christian Joerges, “Social Justice in an Ever More Diverse Union”, in Frank Van-
denbroucke, Catherine Barnard and Geert De Baere (eds), A European Social Union 
after the Crisis, Cambridge University Press 2017, 92-119; available at: SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2697440. 
54  “Die Entstehung des Staates”, n. 3 above. 
55  “The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism”, (1981) 1 Year-
book of European Law, 257-306. 
56  Joseph H.H, Weiler, “Fin-de-Siècle Europe”, in Renaud Dehousse (ed.), Europe af-
ter Maastricht: an Ever Closer Union?, Munich: C.H. Beck 1994, 203-216. 
57  Joseph H.H. Weiler, “Europe in Crisis – On ‘Political Messianism’, ‘Legitimacy’ 
and the ‘Rule of Law’”, (2012) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, 248-168; availa-
ble at: SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2255263). 
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referred to before: laissez faire-liberalism, Polanyi has argued, is but a “stark 
utopia”; it will provoke, and be accompanied by, protective counter-
movements.58 Dani Rodrik’s trilemma theorem suggests that “deep economic 
integration” among constitutional democracies will soon, rather than later, 
have to be either complemented by political union or downscaled. Can legal 
scholarship remain for long forgetful about the proprium of law? Can political 
science59 refuse to consider whether the “new normalcy” of the rule of eco-
nomics, to take up Habermas’ formula, “deserves recognition”? Will Europe’s 
constitutional courts continue to follow the lead of the CJEU when they are 
told that “the financial stability of the euro area as a whole … and of the Union 
itself” is a commitment that trumps the essentials of their constitutional tradi-
tions? Will such messages incentivise the peoples of Europe to oppose populist 
demagogism?60 
                                                 
58  Polanyi, n. 4 above, at 3. 
59  Tellingly, political scientists who do not share the prevailing normative complacency 
in their own discipline, search for support in legal academia – with limited success; 
see Christian Kreuder-Sonnen, “Beyond Integration Theory. The (Anti-) 
Constitutional Dimension of European Crisis Governance”, (2016) 54 Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 1350-1366; id., “An Authoritarian Turn in Europe and Eu-
ropean Studies?”, (2018) 25 Journal of European Public Policy, 452-464. 
60  This essay was finalized on 27 January; this is a date at which the concern for finan-
cial stability signals a crisis rather than a noble commitment. 
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